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III. STATEMENT OF CASE 
 
 A. NATURE OF THE CASE 
 
 This is a modification action involving child custody and child support.  Appellant moved 
to modify custody.  After a trial, the Magistrate Court found a substantial change in 
circumstances had occurred and that it was in the best interests to expand Appellant’s custodial 
time, but denied Appellant’s request to change primary custody of the child from Respondent to 
Appellant.  On appeal, the District Court upheld the Magistrate Court’s decision.  Appellant now 
appeals. 
 B. COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS 
 
 The parties stipulated in open court to entry of a child custody, visitation and support 
order on March 21, 2012.  R., p. 57.  A corresponding Order re: Custody, Visitation and Child 
Support was entered on April 23, 2012.  R., pp. 57-73. 
 On March 16, 2015, Appellant filed a Motion to Modify an Order, Judgment or Decree 
seeking to modify the 2012 Order.  R., pp. 74-97.  Respondent filed her Answer and 
Counterclaim on April 27, 2015.  R., pp. 107-116.  Appellant filed his Reply to Counterclaim on 
May 7, 2015.  R., pp. 117-126.  Trial was held on June 26, 2015 before Magistrate Judge Kent J. 
Merica.  Trial Tr.; Exh. 1-5, 500-507, 509, 511.  The Magistrate Court issued its Findings of 
Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order on August 17, 2015.  R., pp. 177-191.  A corresponding 
Judgment Regarding Modification of Visitation, Custody and Child Support was entered on 
October 16, 2015. 
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 Appellant timely filed his Notice of Appeal to the District Court on November 23, 2015.  
R., pp. 203-211.  The District Court heard oral appellate argument on April 21, 2016 and issued 
its decision affirming the magistrate court’s decision on May 12, 2016.  Dist. Ct. Tr., pp. 1-43; 
R., pp. 359-365.  The District Court further concluded that Appellant had pursued the appeal in a 
manner that was frivolous, unreasonable and without foundation and awarded attorney fees to 
Respondent and against Appellant pursuant to Idaho Code Section 12-121.  R., p. 364.  
Respondent filed a Memorandum of Costs and Attorney Fees on Appeal and supporting 
affidavits on May 25, 2016.  R., pp. 369-380.  On October 21, 2016, during the pendency of this 
appeal to the Idaho Supreme Court, the District Court reversed and vacated its May 12, 2016 
Order as it related to the attorney fee award.1 
 Appellant filed this appeal on June 8, 2016.  R., pp. 381-385. 
 C. FACTUAL BACKGROUND 
 
 Appellant and Respondent shared a residence prior to their son TBE’s birth on December 
1, 2010 until on or around December 1, 2011, but were never married.  R., p. 178.  Under the 
stipulated Order re: Custody, Visitation and Child Support entered on April 23, 2012, the parties 
were awarded joint legal and physical custody of the child under a custodial sharing schedule 
with Respondent designated as the child’s primary residential parent and Appellant entitled to 
custodial time structured around his work schedule that averaged eight overnights per month.  R., 
pp. 57-73, 178. 
 At the time of the modification trial in June 2015, Respondent had resided with TBE in 
the same home in Lewiston, Idaho for 3 years.  R., p. 179.   
                                                 
1 Respondent has filed a Motion to Augment the Record seeking to add the District Court’s October 21, 2016 Order 
on Attorney Fees and Costs to the record of this appeal.  Said Motion is unopposed. 
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 Between entry of the 2012 order and the June 2015 modification trial, Appellant’s work 
schedule had changed to where it came into conflict with the custodial sharing terms of the April 
23, 2012 Order.  R., p. 178.  In light of Appellant’s change in work schedule, “[t]he parties now 
have work schedules that in essence mirror one another’s schedule.”  R., p. 179.  Appellant’s 
new work schedule consisted of 10-hour work days on Mondays through Thursdays.  R., p. 178.  
At the time of trial, Respondent’s work schedule was Monday through Thursday from 5:30 a.m. 
to 4:00 p.m.  Id.   
 Both parties acknowledged friction and some problems due to lack of communication and 
similar issues.  R., p. 181.  Despite this friction, the parties had successfully adjusted the 
custodial sharing schedule prior to trial in order to accommodate Appellant’s change of work 
schedule.  R., p. 179. 
 Appellant began dating Erica Wilcoxson in 2011.  R., p. 180.  Appellant and Ms. 
Wilcoxson (now Appellant’s wife) began sharing a residence in December 2012.  Id.  
Appellant’s and Ms. Wilcoxson’s son was born in May 2013 and was 2 years old at the 
time of the modification trial.  Id.  Ms. Wilcoxson was pregnant with her and Appellant’s second 
child at trial.  Id.  Ms. Wilcoxson is a stay-at-home parent except for part-time work done out of 
her home as a hairstylist in evenings and on weekends in order not to conflict with Appellant’s 
work schedule.  Id.   
 At the time of trial, TBE was 4 years old.  R., p. 181.  His parents and all witnesses 
described him as being well-adjusted and a bright, loving child, who had been accepted without 
reservations into their homes, including Ms. Wilcoxson’s extended family.  Id.  The Magistrate 
Court found that the child loves both families and is a happy content child.  Id.  
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IV. ADDITIONAL ISSUE PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
 
 1. Whether to award Respondent her attorney fees and costs incurred in this appeal 
from District Court pursuant to I.C. § 12-121. 
V. ARGUMENT 
 A. STANDARD OF REVIEW 
 
 Since this appeal arises from a decision of the district court affirming a decision of the 
magistrate division, the Court shall review the magistrate’s decision independently, with due 
regard for the decision of the district court acting in its appellant capacity.  Hoskinson v. 
Hoskinson, 139 Idaho 448, 454, 80 P.3d 1049, 1055 (2003) (citing Stevens v. Stevens, 135 Idaho 
224, 227, 16 P.3d 900, 903 (2000); Keller v. Keller, 130 Idaho 661, 663, 946 P.2d 623, 625 
(1997)).  The magistrate’s findings of fact will be upheld if they are supported by substantial and 
competent evidence.  Id. (citing Worzala v. Worzala, 128 Idaho 408, 411, 913 P.2d 1178, 1181 
(1996), Smith v. Smith, 124 Idaho 431, 436, 860 P.2d 634, 639 (1993)). 
 The determination of the custody of minor children is committed to the sound discretion 
of the trial court.  Levin v. Levin, 122 Idaho 583, 586, 836 P.2d 529, 532 (1992).  A trial court 
does not abuse its discretion if it (1) correctly perceived the issue as one of discretion; (2) acted 
within the outer boundaries of its discretion and consistently with the legal standards applicable 
to the specific choices available to it; and (3) reached its decision by an exercise of reason.  Sun 
Valley Shopping Ctr., Inc. v. Idaho Power Co., 119 Idaho 87, 94, 803 P.2d 993, 1000 (1991)).   
“An abuse of discretion occurs when the evidence is insufficient to support a magistrate’s 
conclusion that the interests and welfare of the children would be best served by a particular 
5 
custody award or modification.”  Lamont v. Lamont, 158 Idaho 353, 356, 347 P.3d 645, 648 
(2015) (quoting Nelson v. Nelson, 144 Idaho 710, 713, 170 P.3d 375, 378 (2007)). 
B. THE MAGISTRATE COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION IN 
MAKING ITS CUSTODY DECISION. 
 Appellant argues on this appeal that the magistrate court abused its discretion regarding 
the best interests of the child, the lack of the application of the factors found in Idaho Code 
Section 32-717, and the substantial and material change of circumstances.  Appellant’s Brief at 
17.  For the reasons discussed below, the magistrate did not abuse its wide discretion. 
1. The magistrate properly perceived the custody determination before it as 
an issue of discretion. 
 The first prong of “abuse of discretion” analysis is whether the trial court correctly 
perceived the issue as one of discretion.  Hoskinson v. Hoskinson, 139 Idaho 448, 454, 80 P.3d 
1049, 1055 (2003).   
 Here, the magistrate court correctly recognized that the custody determination before it 
was an issue of discretion stating: 
In matters of child custody and parent time with children, the trial court is vested 
with broad discretion to fashion an arrangement that is fair and equitable to the 
parties, and, is in the best interests of the children. 
 
R., p. 182 (citing Peterson v. Peterson, 153 Idaho 318, 321, 281 P.3d 1096, 1099 (2012)).   
 As such, analysis of this first prong does not support a finding of abuse of discretion. 
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2. The magistrate acted within the outer boundaries of its discretion and 
consistently with the legal standards applicable to the specific choices 
available to it. 
i. No abuse of discretion lies where the magistrate court does not 
specifically discuss the non-mandatory factors from I.C. § 32-
717.  
 It is well settled under Idaho law that in determining the custody of a minor child, the 
child’s welfare and best interest is of paramount consideration.  Shumway v. Shumway, 106 
Idaho 416, 679 P.2d 1133 (1984); Empey v. Empey, 78 Idaho 25, 296 P.2d 1028 (1956); Maudlin 
v. Maudlin, 68 Idaho 64, 188 P.2d 323 (1948).  This Court has discussed the “best interests” 
standard as follows: 
 
Idaho Code § 32-717 provides a directive for the trial court to determine the best 
interest of the children when making a custody decision.  The statute sets forth 
non-exclusive factors to aid in making its determination.  Idaho Code § 32-717 
states in this respect: 
 
(1) In an action for divorce the court may, before and after judgment, give such 
direction for the custody, care and education of the children of the marriage as 
may seem necessary or proper in the best interests of the children.  The court 
shall consider all relevant factors which may include: 
 
(a) The wishes of the child’s parent or parents as to his or her custody; 
(b)  The wishes of the child as to his or her custodian; 
(c)  The interaction and interrelationship of the child with his or her parent or 
parents, and his or her siblings; 
(d)  The child’s adjustment to his or her home, school, and community; 
(e)  The character and circumstances of all individuals involved; 
(f)  The need to promote continuity and stability in the life of the child; and 
(g)  Domestic violence as defined in section 39-6303, Idaho Code, whether or not 
in the presence of the child. 
 
This list of factors is not exhaustive or mandatory and courts are free to 
consider other factors that may be relevant. 
 
Lamont v. Lamont, 158 Idaho 353, 359, 347 P.3d 645, 651 (2015) (emphasis added) (citations 
omitted). 
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 Appellant argues that the Magistrate Court and District Court erred by the trial court 
having “never noted the importance of I.C. § 32-717 and the district court seems to have totally 
denied the factors set out in I.C. § 32-717 are meaningful or relevant at all” and “is basically 
saying one factor from I.C. § 32-717 was sufficient in the analysis of the issues of custody and 
the child’s best interests and parent-sharing involving TBE.”  Appellant’s Brief at 25, 26.  
Because the I.C. 32-717 factors are not mandatory, it was not an abuse of the magistrate court’s 
wide discretion to omit express reference to the factors, or to weigh the evidence in a different 
fashion than advocated for by Appellant.  It was well within the magistrate court’s discretion to 
consider the positive parenting attributes of Respondent that are noted by Appellant as well as 
the overall circumstances of each parent.  Appellant’s Brief at 24.   
 Appellant points to later custody decisions written by Judge Merica as proof that the 
magistrate court had “[seen] the error of his way from the Elliot case by substantially changing 
the format of his decisions after Elliott,” without authority or discussion on this separate case’s 
significance or bearing on the case on appeal.  Appellant’s Brief at 24-25.  No significance or 
bearing is readily apparent. 
 As such, this argument is without merit, no reversible error has been shown, and the 
magistrate court’s decision should be affirmed. 
ii. The magistrate did not abuse its discretion by overemphasizing 
any factor. 
 Appellant argues that the magistrate court abused its discretion by overemphasizing the 
need to promote continuity and stability in the life of the child.  Appellant’s Brief at 25-26.  An 
overemphasis of a single factor is an abuse of discretion.  Schultz v. Schultz, 145 Idaho 859, 865, 
187 P.3d 1234, 1240 (2008); Moye v. Moye, 102 Idaho 170, 172, 627 P.2d 799, 801 (1981).  No 
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such overemphasis has been shown or is supported by a reasonable reading of the magistrate 
court’s decision. 
 In the Schultz case, this Court concluded that the only factor the trial court had considered 
was the distance between the father and child created by the mother’s relocation from Idaho to 
Oregon.  145 Idaho at 865, 187 P.3d 1240.  In doing so, the trial court failed to consider the 
mother’s wishes for the child, the history of domestic violence in the child’s presence, the 
father’s failure to make attempts to visit the child in Oregon, or the stability and community 
support available to the mother in Oregon.  Id.   Further, the Schultz trial court failed to make 
findings or otherwise decide the issue of whether the habitual domestic violence present 
overcame the presumption in favor of joint custody.  Id.  In addition, this Court concluded that 
the Schultz trial court had incorrectly applied its holding in Hopper v. Hopper.2  Id.  This Court 
concluded that the failure to recognize and evaluate these factors constituted an abuse of 
discretion.  Id. 
 In the Moye case, the magistrate court found that the mother’s physical health was 
improperly overemphasized where 6 of the 10 findings of fact contained in the trial court’s order 
addressed the mother’s physical health.  102 Idaho 170, 173 fn.2, 627 P.2d 799, 802 fn.2 (1981).  
This Court concluded that the trial court had overemphasized the mother’s physical condition 
and not given due consideration of all other relevant factors impacting the best interests of the 
children, or at least failed to reflect such consideration on the record, which was an abuse of its 
discretion.  Id. at 172, 627 P.2d at 801. 
 Here, the magistrate court made four pages of findings of fact, which describe in detail 
the history of the parents’ relationship, the history of changes in each parent’s work schedules, 
the parents’ efforts to work together to accommodate these work schedule changes, the history of 
                                                 
2 144 Idaho 624, 167 P.3d 761 (2007). 
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Appellant’s relationship with Ms. Wilcoxson, each parent’s home, Ms. Wilcoxson’s work 
schedule, the child’s relationship with Ms. Wilcoxson and his younger brother Easton, the child’s 
relationship with Ms. Wilcoxson’s extended family and Respondent’s mother, co-parenting 
challenges between the parties, the child’s adjustment to daycare, the expectation that the child 
attend preschool the next academic year, and child’s general disposition.  R., pp. 178-181.  The 
magistrate court further discussed its “best interests” analysis for nearly 6 pages. R., pp. 182-187.  
In said analysis, the Court identified 13 specific and diverse points through which the magistrate 
court concluded that it was in the best interests of the child for Respondent to retain primary 
residential custody of the child with expanded time to Appellant.  Id.   
 No reasonable reading of the trial court’s analysis supports the conclusion that any single 
factor was over-emphasized.  Instead, the District Court was correct when it concluded that 
“[Appellant’s] argument was in essence only that the magistrate should be second guessed and a 
different answer reached in his favor.  His conclusory assertions are not enough to overcome the 
magistrate’s thorough discussion and discretionary findings.”  R., p. 364.  Likewise, Appellant’s 
argument and conclusory assertions to this Court are insufficient to support a finding of abuse of 
discretion.  As such, the magistrate court’s ruling should be affirmed. 
iii. The magistrate court did not abuse its discretion in finding that a 
substantial and material change of circumstances had occurred, 
but did not support the requested custody change. 
 Appellant states that the magistrate court erred in its analysis about the substantial and 
material change in circumstance.  Appellant’s Brief at 17, 23.  It is well settled that a child 
custody order of a minor child may not be modified unless there has been a material, permanent 
and substantial change in circumstances subsequent to entry of the original decree which would 
indicate that a modification is in the best interests of the child.  Posey v. Bunney, 98 Idaho 258, 
261, 561 P.2d 400, 403 (1977).  Whether a change in conditions is “material” or “substantial” 
10 
depends upon the impact of the change on the children.  Doe v. Doe, I.S.C. Docket No. 43920 
(Nov. 2, 2016).    
 Here, the magistrate court reasoned that a change in a parent’s work schedule can be 
substantial enough to justify “a change in the parent-sharing arrangement so that each party 
continues to have meaningful time with their child(ren),” but “does not equate to a material 
change of circumstances that would justify changing custody.”  R., p. 185.  This conclusion is 
certainly within the outer boundaries of the magistrate court’s discretion and consistent with the 
legal standards applicable to the specific choices available to it.  As such, no abuse of discretion 
has been shown and the magistrate court’s ruling should be affirmed. 
3. The magistrate reached its decision by an exercise of reason. 
 The third prong of the “abuse of discretion” analysis is whether the trial court reached its 
decision by an exercise of reason.  Hoskinson v. Hoskinson, 139 Idaho 448, 454, 80 P.3d 1049, 
1055 (2003).  Here, the magistrate court’s decision contains a thorough “best interest” analysis 
that is consistent with its factual findings.  R., p. 182-187.   
 No reasonable reading of the magistrate court’s conclusions support the determination 
that said analysis fails to constitute an exercise of reason.  As such, no abuse of discretion has 
been shown, and the magistrate court’s decision should be affirmed. 
C. THE ISSUE OF ATTORNEY FEES AWARDED BY THE DISTRICT 
COURT IS NO LONGER AT ISSUE. 
 In its May 12, 2016 Order, the District Court awarded attorney fees to Respondent and 
against Appellant pursuant to Idaho Code Section 12-121 on the basis that Appellant pursued his 
appeal to District Court in a manner that was frivolous, unreasonable, and without foundation.  
R., p. 364.  Appellant filed this appeal on June 8, 2016, and included argument in support of 
reversal of the May 12, 2016 attorney fee award in his Appellant’s Brief dated September 28, 
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2016.  App. Br., § VI(A), pp. 18-22.  On October 21, 2016, the District Court reversed and 
vacated its May 12, 2016 Order as it related to the attorney fee award due to Respondent’s 
inclusion of her attorney free request in the conclusion to her Amended Respondent’s Brief, 
rather than as a separate issue raised in her original response brief.  Order on Attorney Fees and 
Costs.   
 Based on said reversal, the District Court’s award of attorney fees to Respondent is no 
longer at issue in this case.   
 D. APPELLANT IS NOT ENTITLED TO ATTORNEY’S FEES ON APPEAL. 
 
 Appellant has requested an award for fees and costs against Respondent pursuant to 
Rules 35(b)(5), 35(b)(6) and 41(a) of the Idaho Appellate Rules, and Idaho Code Sections 12-
121, 12-123, 32-704 and 32-705.   
 Appellant makes his request based on the assumption that he will be the prevailing party 
in this appeal.  Appellant’s Brief at 36.  Appellant should not prevail for the reasons discussed 
above.  See supra § V(B).     
 Even if Appellant were to prevail in this appeal, the relevant rules of the Idaho Appellate 
Rules that Appellant cites to set forth the appropriate mechanism through which attorney fees 
must be sought on appeal, but do not provide an independent basis for such an award.  I.A.R. 
35(b)(5), 35(b)(6), and 41(a).  Such requests must be supported by statute.  Appellant cites to 
four statutes, Idaho Code Sections 12-123, 12-121, 32-704 and 32-705, none of which support an 
award of attorney fees to Appellant in this appeal. 
1. I.C. 12-123 does not support an award of attorney fees to Appellant. 
 Idaho Code Section 12-123 provides a means through which a party may be sanctioned 
for frivolous conduct in a civil case.  It is well settled that it does not apply on appeal to this 
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Court.  Cummings v. Stephens, 2016 Opinion No. 97 (Sept. 12, 2016) (quoting Bird v. Bidwell, 
147 Idaho 350, 353, 209 P.3d 647, 650 (2009)).  As such, even if Appellant is found to be the 
prevailing party on this appeal, Appellant’s request for an award of attorney fees pursuant to 
Idaho Code Section 12-123 should be denied. 
2. I.C. 12-121 does not support an award of attorney fees to Appellant. 
 Until the recent Hoffer v. Shappard decision, I.S.C. Docket No. 42087 (Sept. 28, 2016), 
awards of attorney fees on appeal pursuant to Idaho Code Section 12-121 have been “permitted 
for a prevailing party when the Court determines that an appeal was brought, pursued or 
defended in a manner that was frivolous, unreasonable or without foundation.”  Lamont v. 
Lamont, 158 Idaho 353, 362, 347 P.3d 645, 655 (2015) (quoting Clair v. Clair, 153 Idaho 278, 
291, 281 P.3d 115, 128 (2012)).  Appellant criticizes Respondent for errors related to the District 
Court’s attorney fee award, which ultimately led to its reversal.  Appellant’s Brief at 36.  In light 
of said reversal, those oversights have no bearing on the appeal to this Court.  See supra § V(C).  
Appellant’s surviving criticisms are of the magistrate’s decision, not of any action by 
Respondent.  Appellant’s Brief at 36.  Appellant provides no argument on how this Court may 
conclude that Respondent has defended this appeal in a manner that was frivolous, unreasonable 
or without foundation.  See Lamont, 158 Idaho at 362, 347 P.3d at 655.  As such, even if 
Appellant is found to be the prevailing party on appeal, Appellant’s request for an award of 
attorney fees pursuant to Idaho Code Section 12-121 should be denied. 
                                                 
3 The rule set forth in Hoffer v. Shappard relating to application of Idaho Code Section 12-121 will become effective 
on March 1, 2017 and have prospective effect.  As of the writing of this Brief, oral argument in this case has not 
been calendared.  This Brief is written under the assumption that the “frivolous, unreasonable or without 
foundation” standard will be applied to this case.  In support of this assumption, Respondent notes that while this 
Court has amended Rule 54(e), Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure rescinding subsection 2 of that Rule effective March 
1, 2017, no amendment to Rule 908 of the Idaho Rules of Family Law Procedure has been made as of the writing of 
this Brief.  Rule 908, Idaho Rules of Family Law Procedure states in relevant part: “Provided, attorney fees under 
section 12-121, Idaho Code, may be awarded by the court only when it finds, from the facts presented to it, that the 
case was brought, pursued or defended frivolously, unreasonably or without foundation[.]” 
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3. I.C. 32-704 and 32-705 do not support an award of attorney fees to 
Appellant.  
 Appellant cites to Idaho Code Sections 32-704 and 32-705 as a basis for an attorney fee 
award in this appeal against Respondent.  Appellant’s Brief at 36.   
 Idaho Code Section 32-705 governs spousal maintenance awards in a divorce setting.  As 
this is not a divorce action and does not involve spousal maintenance, Respondent assumes that 
Appellant’s reference to this statutory section is due to Idaho Code Section 32-704(3)’s reliance 
upon the factors found in Idaho Code Section 32-705 as the applicable standard in determining 
financial need, and does not argue for its use as an independent basis to support his attorney fee 
request.   
 Idaho Code Section 32-704 allows for an award of fees based on financial need.  Hentges 
v. Hentges, 115 Idaho 192, 197, 765 P.2d 1094, 1099 (Ct.App. 1998).  Appellant did not request 
attorney fees to either the magistrate judge or district court under Idaho Code Section 32-704.  
R., pp. 74-97, 133-136, 137-152, 163-176, 203-211, 215-248, 290-337.  The findings related to 
income are insufficient to support an award of attorney’s fees under Idaho Code Section 32-704.  
R., pp. 178-180.  Based upon the insufficiency of the record to support an award under Idaho 
Code Section 32-704, even if Appellant is found to be the prevailing party on this appeal, 
Appellant’s request for an award of attorney fees under this statute should be denied. 
E. THE COURT SHOULD AWARD RESPONDENT HER ATTORNEY’S 
FEES ON THIS APPEAL. 
 Respondent makes her request for fees and costs against Appellant pursuant to Idaho 
Code Section 12-121.  As discussed above, this Brief is written under the assumption that the 
“frivolous, unreasonable and without foundation” standard for purposes of Idaho Code Section 
12-121 will apply in this case.  See supra § V(D), fn. 3.  That standard has been met in this case.  
The District Court correctly found as follows: 
[Appellant's] argument was in essence only that the magistrate should be second 
guessed and a different answer reached in his favor. His conclusory assertions are 
not enough to overcome the magistrate's thorough discussion and discretionary 
findings. This Court, like the Idaho Supreme Court in Lamont, is unconvinced 
that there were genuine issues of law or fact raised, and therefore finds that this 
appeal was pursued in a manner that was frivolous, unreasonable, and without 
foundation. 
R., p. 364. Appellant similarly seeks to second guess the magistrate court's discretionary 
decision in the appeal to this Court, and as such his pursuit of this appeal is frivolous, 
unreasonable and without foundation. See supra § V(B). As such, good cause exists for this 
Court to award Respondent her costs and fees pursuant to Idaho Code Section 12-121. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
For these reasons, Respondent Sarah Geiger respectfully requests that this Court affirm 
the Magistrate Court's decision as upheld by the District Court, and further enter an award of 
attorney's fees and costs incurred on this appeal from District Court against Appellant and in 
Respondent's favor. 
DATED this,;12 day ofNovember, 2016. 
JONES, BROWER & CALLERY, P.L.L.C. 
r~'--~ 
KARIN SEUBERT 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that two true and correct copies of the foregoing RESPONDENT'S 
BRIEF were, this o<.s day of November, 2016, e-mailed and hand-delivered to: 
Charles M. Stroschein 
Clark and Feeney 
P.O. Drawer 285 
Lewiston, ID 83501 
charm@clarkandfeeney.com 
~ &-«1,-cd-: 
KARIN SEUBERT 
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Appendix A: 
Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order dated Aug. 17, 2015 
Clerk's Record, pages 177-188 (Child Support Worksheets and Supplemental Order Regarding 
Parental Responsibilities excluded from this Appendix) 
SARAH MONIQUE GEIGER, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
BRANDON TOM ELLIOT, 
Defendant. 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
-~·--·"' 
Fl LED 
CASE NO. CV 2011-2416 
FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS 
OF LAW, AND ORDER 
The above matter came on for hearing on 26th day of June, 2015. Both parties were 
present with their respective attorneys. The Court having considered the evidence and exhibits 
presented to the court at trial and the matter been finally submitted with the filing of the rebuttal 
closing argument on July 28, 2015, the Court now makes its decision. 
COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS 
The plaintiff filed a Complaint for Paternity, Custody, Visitation and Suppo1i on 
December 6, 2011. A temporary custody order was entered on December 22, 2011. The parties 
reached an agreement for temporary matters on January 18, 2012. Trial was set for March 21, 
2012. At the time of the trial, the parties reached an agreement as to all issues and an Order 
Regarding Custody, Visitation, and Child Support encompassing the parties' agreement was filed 
on April 23, 2012. 
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FINDINGS OFF ACT 
The parties were never married, however, they did reside together for a period of time 
before and after the birth of their son TBE, on December I, 2010. They separated from living 
. with each.o.ther....appr0-xmiat.el¥,.December- l,. 2011..~ The parties reached an agreement.witb • .t.eg_ard .. ,:,.-.~ •. r- ,·-···-
to custody and parent time which was entered in the record on April 23, 2012, as found in the 
Order Regarding Custody, Visitation, and Child Support. As a result of that order, the plaintiff 
was designated the primary residential parent for TBE. The defendant worked a staggered 
schedule which allowed him to have a block of four ( 4) days off from work, commencing on a 
different day each week. Pursuant to the agreement, the defendant was to have TBE from 6:00 
AM on the 2nd day of his time off from work until 5:00 PM the 3rd day of his time off from 
work. He was to have this amount of time each and every week. This resulted in eight (8) 
overnights per month on average for Mr. Elliot. 
On March 16; 2015, the defendant1 filed a motion to modify the Order Regarding 
Custody, Visitation, and Child Support, entered April 23, 2012. In the filing, the defendant 
alleges that he was offered a new job with a Monday to Thursday schedule consisting of IO-hour 
work days. This new job schedule conflicted directly with the custody and visitation schedule of 
the parties' April 23, 2012 stipulated order. As a temporary solution, Mr. Elliot has TBE every 
three (3) out of the four (4) weekends per month. 
The plaintiff, Sarah Geiger, is employed by Vista Outdoors, formerly known as ATK. 
She has worked there on the assembly line for nine (9) years. She earns $17.42 per hour and 
works 40 hours a week. Her schedule is Monday through Thursday from 5:30 AM to 4:00 PM. 
1 In order to avoid confusion the, Court may refer to the parties as plaintiff and as defendant in this decision. 
Technically, the defendant is the "petitioner" for this proceeding. 
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She and TBE live in a modest home in Lewiston. It is a two-bedroom one-bath home 
which she is buying. She has lived there for three (3) years. TBE has primarily resided with her 
his entire life. She never married the defendant and is not involved with any particular person as 
.c: .i.1.-- "~·-·-" • 2 
-- ,. ;- -~·--1aPaS-1!.1:11:.·•ci=~-1s,aware-;'- -,---- ---·~----.,...--., .. ······-"-'"--"---- .------··· --·-· , ___ -----· - ~·-. 
The prior court Order Regarding Custody, Visitation, and Child Support of April 23, 
2012, was an agreed arrangement between the parties. It was consistent with the defendant's 
work schedule at Clearwater Paper. It provided weekly contact for Mr .. Elliot with his son in 
conjunction with his work schedule. As noted previously, the defendant would spend two (2) 
full days and nights with his son each week. Mr. Elliot testified that in addition to that he would 
make additional time to spend with TBE. The defendant changed his employment position at 
Clearwater Paper so that he no longer works a rotating shift. The parties now have work 
schedules that in essence mirror one another's schedule. As noted, the parties have adjusted on 
an informal basis Mr. Elliot's time with TBE to accommodate the change of schedule. 
:Mr. Elliot has been employed at Clearwater Paper since 2007. He presently works as a 
training coordinator on one of the paper machines at the company. For 2014, Mr. Elliot reported 
a total of wages in the amount of $67,089.00. No testimony or evidence was presented by either 
party as to whether or not Mr. Elliot's new position as a training coordinator resulted in an 
increase in wages. In looking at respondent's Exhibit 500, the Court cannot discern what Mr. 
2 No evidence or reference to a significant other was brought forward during the course of the trial. 
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Elliot's gross earnings today would be. Therefore; the Court will utilize last year's tax return for 
purposes of calculation of child support.3 
Mr. Elliot began seeing Erica Wilcoxon in the winter of 2011. They have known each 
-·- -'"Other"fot-approximately eleven (1-1.)~years and actually-dated when Ms. Wiloo-~na;Was_.,,l..i~m-.1;,..,_. "' -·,"-·---·"''-,-., ,,_ 
old. They started having a serious relationship and spring of 2012. In December of 2012, Ms. 
Wilcoxon purchased a home in Lewiston. :Mr. Elliot moved in with her at the time of purchase 
as Ms. Wilcoxon testified at trial. She described her house is a nice three-bedroom, two-bath, 
home in a quiet neighborhood with a large fenced yard. They are surrounded with very nice 
neighbors and they are only blocks away from Ms. Wilcoxon's mother. 
In May of 2013, :Mr. Elliot and Ms. Wilcoxon had a child together. It was a boy, Easton 
and he is 2-years-old. Easton and TBE are very close to one another and enjoy a very rich 
brotherly relationship. Ms. Wilcoxon is pregnant with another boy and is due to deliver the child 
in September. Mr. Elliot and Ms. Wilcoxon plan to be married in November of this year. 
Ms. Wilcoxon is a hairstylist and operates a styling salon out of her home. Her shop is 
located in an outbuilding on the property. She schedules her appointments in the evenings and 
on weekends. She does this to correspond with.Mr. Elliot's work schedule. This allows her to be 
a stay-at-home mom to her son Easton and also allows her to provide child care for TBE. Ms. 
Wilcoxon and Mr. Elliot testified that TBE has integrated well with Ms. Wilcoxon. TBE spends 
time with her and of course with his brother Easton. TBE has been accepted fully into Ms. 
Wilcoxon's extended family and he enjoys his interactions with them. 
3 The Court does not consider it to be the function of the Court to try to decipher exhibits. Counsel should present to 
the Court some expianation of the exhibit so that the Court can make a reasoned decision with regard to the 
financials of the parties. For example, on respondent's Exhibit 500 there are categories under the earnings that the 
Court is unsure whether or not they should be included for purposes of determining gross wages. There are 
references to "Retro-RPM", "Holiday-HPN", and "Premium OTP-PR2" that have no explanation as to whether or 
not they should be included in gross wages. 
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For her part, Sarah Geiger indicates that ·slie does not have any objection to TBE 
spending time with Ms. Wilcoxon even when Mr. Elliot is not at home. In fact Ms. Wilcoxon 
has regularly picked up TBE from the day care in order to have him at her home with her and 
situations because of a lack of communication between Mr. Elliot and/or Ms. Wilcoxon. Ms. 
Geiger also noted there have been some problems. Both parties acknowledged at trial that this 
was a challenge for them. 
TBE is 4-years-old. Both parties and all witnesses described TBE as being well-adjusted 
and a bright, loving child. Both parties and all witnesses testified that TBE has been accepted 
without reservation· into their homes, whether it is IBE's extended family, or the ''adopted" 
extended family of Ms. Wilcoxon. It is evident from the description of the parties and the 
exhibits submitted to the Court that TBE loves both families and is a happy content child. TBE's 
day generally starts at 5:00 AM or shortly thereafter. Ms. Geiger talces him to Tender Care Day 
Care in Lewiston. Ms. Geiger describes TBE as being ve-ry well adjusted to this day care setting. 
He enjoys being there. He has friends at the day care. Ms. Geiger reports that he will begin pre-
school there in the fall of 2015. 
Ms. Geiger's mother, Susan Geiger, spends several days a month with TBE. Susan 
Geiger lives outside of Orofino Idaho, but comes to Lewiston on a regular basis to work as an 
"insurance biller". She testified that she will spend nights in Lewiston with her daughter and 
with TBE on a regular basis. She describes Sarah Geiger as doing very well being a mother. She 
describes her daughter as doing a very good job raising TBE. She also describes TBE as being 
very close with his mother. She has frequent one-on-one time with TBE. It is not uncommon for 
TBE to come with her to her home and spend time with her and her husband, TBE' s grandfather. 
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In matters of child custody and parent time with children, the trial court is vested with I 
f 
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bem interests of the children. See Peterson v. Peterson. 153 Idaho 318, 321 (2012). If a trial I 
court acts within the outer bounds of its discretion and reaches a parent-time decision with the 
exercise of reason, such decision will be upheld on any subsequent appeal. Id. The appellate 
courts will not set aside the findings of the trial court, even if the evidence presented at trial is 
conflicting, so long as the findings of the trial court are based upon substantial competent 
evidence. 
In situations such as the case at bar, the Court does not want to become a micromanager 
of all issues that surface between separated parents. This calls for restraint by the parties and 
also by the Court when considering changes to custody and parent-time decisions after the 
original judgment is entered. The overall goal of the court is to bring about continuity and 
stability as much as possible in the lives of the children. See e.g. Stockwell v. Stockwell, 116 
Idaho 97 (1989); Ford v. Ford, 108 Idaho 443 (1985); and, McGriff v. McGriff, 140 Idaho 642 
(2004). 
To avoid continuous relitigation of custody matters, the Idaho courts developed a 
standard that provides that a petitioner must show material, permanent, and substantial changes 
in circumstances which require the court to change or modify custody and the Court must do so 
if it is in the best interests of the child. See Poesy v. Bunny, 98 Idaho 257 (1977). In Posey the 
court discusses at length the standard regarding modification of existing child custody decrees. 
As the court notes, the trial court is to look at changes in circumstances which have a nexus with 
FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS 
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the best interests of the child. If there is no nexus, ·then the change of custody is not in the 
child's best interest. See Poesy generally. 
The issue of custody modifications was re-examined by our Supreme Court in McGriff v. 
any analysis regarding the material change in circumstances. This, Poesy emphasizes, 'is the 
controlling consideration in all custody proceedings.' Id. at 642. As noted by the court in 
McGrtjJ, supra., Levin v. Leven, 122 Idaho 583 (1992), and in Poesy, supra., the "threshold 
question is whether a permanent substantial change in circumstances has occurred." 
In evaluating the matter, this Court concludes that this record does not show a substantial, 
material change of circumstances since the entry of the last custody order on April 23, 2012, that 
would justify changing custody from Ms. Geiger to Mr. Elliot. Since the entry of the last order 
regarding custody, there have not been substantial changes in the life of TBE as is noted by the 
following points: 
TBE is living in the same house with his mother. 
TBE and Ms. Geiger have lived there for over three (3) years. 
TBE has primarily resided his mother during his young life. 
Ms. Geiger has provided appropriate parenting to TBE. 
Ms. Geiger has seen to his medical needs. 
Ms. Geiger has arranged child care. 
Ms. Geiger has devoted her personal time to providing an appropriate environment 
forTBE. 
Nothing in TBE's life has substantially changed since the entry of the last decree. 
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TBEhas continued to have on-going parental time with his father, Mr. Elliot. 
- Mr. Elliot is living with Ms. Wilcoxon in a residence that for all intents and purposes 
is probably the only residence that TBE knows of with his father. This might be a 
the home in December of 2012, and Mr. Elliot moved into the home at the same time 
Ms. Wilcoxon did. TBE has been a part of this relationship since the spring of 2012. 
Again, nothing has changed substantially sinpe the entry of the last order. TBE has 
benefited from the relationship of Mr. Elliot and Ms. Wilcoxon and the Court 
anticipates he will continue to do so in the future. This might be considered a change 
of circumstance, however, TBE has had this relationship for most of the time since 
the last order.4 
TBE is attending day care at Tender Care Day Care. He has done this for all intents 
and purposes since birth. This has been a good opportunity for TBE. He enjoys his 
time there. 
TBE has a close relationship with his maternal grandparents. During Ms. Geiger's 
parent time, TBE enjoys frequent contact with his grandmother. Susan Geiger 
testified that she will spend afternoons with TBE two (2) to three (3) times a week. 
This has taken place for substantial periods of time, and again is a positive influence 
for TBE. Again, this is not a change of circumstance since the last order. 
Since the entry of the Order Regarding Custody, Visitation, and Child Support on 
April 23, 2012, Mr. Elliot has had access to TBE at times other than his parent time. 
4 Toe Court does not wish to minimize the value of Ms. Wilcoxon' s home with TBE. The Cowt is certain that it is 
positive and of benefit to him. The focus of the analysis by the Court is TBE's relationship with his parents and 
what changes in circumstances necessitate the Court to change parental custody. 
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There has been no material change in .. tbis relationship in the last two and a half (2'l2) 
years. Based on the evidence presented, it appears Ms. Geiger has been very 
receptive to Mr. Elliot and Ms. Wilcoxon to have TBE above and beyond the agreed-
supporting a change of custody. Rather, this is cooperative and collaborative 
parenting which should be encouraged in all parent-sharing relationships. 
:Mr. Elliot presented to the Court a lifestyle with Ms. Wilcoxon that promotes 
appropriate care and a positive development and environment for TBE. The Court 
lauds Mr. Elliot for his parenting skills and appropriate goals for him and his family. 
. . 
This, however, is not a change of circumstance that would justify a change of 
custody. TBE is benefiting from this in the current parenting schedule and will 
continue to do so without a disruptive change of custody between the parties. 
In Mr. Elliot's Motion to Modify an Order, Judgment or Decree filed on March 16, 2015, 
he asserts that the substantial and material change of circumstances with respect to child custody 
was a change of job assignments at his employer which resulted in a new work schedule of 
Mondays through Thursdays. Further, that the new work schedule would conflict with the 
parent-sharing arrangement. The Court does not deem this to be a material change in 
circumstance in and of itself. The record that was presented to the Court does not equate to a 
material change of circllillstance that would justify changing custody. A new work schedule 
typically will not represent a circumstance that requires the Comt to alter the custodial 
arrangement between parties. Such a change certainly justifies a change in the parent~sharing 
arrangement so that each party continues to have meaningful time with their child(ren). 
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··currently, the parties are working the same schedule0Mondays through Thursdays. The 
hours are slightly different but essentially the parties have the same work schedule. Once Mr. 
Elliot changed positions at his employment, he could no longer exercise the schedule contained 
agreed to replace the previous parent-sharing time schedule with Mr. Elliot exercising three (3) 
weekends per month. This is not a positive arrangement for the parties and TBE. Both parties 
said as much at the trial. Such a schedule requires multiple changes in parent time every week 
and obviously this does not lead to stability and continuity for TBE. As noted in the joint 
custody provisions of Idaho Code §32-717B(2) ''.joint physical custody shall be shared by the 
parents in such a way to assure the child a frequent and continuing contact with both parents but 
does not necessarily mean ... the child should be alternating back and forth over certain periods 
of time between each parent." The Court concludes that TBE will benefit from blocks of time 
with each parent because it will provide "a continuing relationship with both parents [which] is 
in the child's best interest." Schultz v. Schultz, 145 Idaho 859, 865 (2008). 
The Court concludes that the parties shall continue to have joint legal and physical 
custody subject to the following parent sharing: 
1) Brandon Elliot shall have parent time every other Wednesday to Sunday, 
commencing and ending at 5:00 PM. 
2) Sarah Geiger shall have parent time at all other times. 
3) Brandon Elliot shall continue to have the right to schedule work-related care for 
TBE with his fiancee Erica Wilcoxon during Ms. Elliot's parent time, so long as such care is 
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agreed upori. by Ms. Geiger and, further, it does not conflict with Ms. Geiger's arrangements with 
her mother Susan Geiger and/or activities at pre-school. 5 
4) The parties stated that they were satisfied with the holiday schedule contained in 
' t 
f 
I 
r 
I 
I 
I 
'· ,.,~,-,:,-,...-.."',...·the priur-Order Regarding· Gustody;•l/is.tat-i@R;la:ae,,Glrikl Support-of April.23,-20.J,2 .. ~ Toe.Court ...... --~ ..... ,. ... :.. ... · 
will honor that representation, however, the Court anticipates that as TBE develops and matures 
he will be capable of spending additional blocks of time with the parties. The parties should 
consider negotiating a schedule that will anticipate summer vacation from school, a division of 
the time for Christmas/New Year's Day release from school, alternating spring break release 
from school, and the Thanksgiving Day release from school. Hopefully, by doing that, they will 
minimize the need to return to court. 
Child Support 
The Court concludes that the annual income for Sarah Geiger for purposes of child 
support is $36,233.60 ($17.42 per houtx 40 hours x 52 weeks). 
The parties each carry medical insurance on TBE through employment and stated that 
they will continue to do so. Ms. Geiger's health coverage shall continue to be the primary 
coverage. 
The Court concludes Mr. Elliot's annual income for purposes of child support is 
$67,089.00, and Mr. Elliot retains the right to claim TBE for income tax purposes. 
The Court has attached as Exhibit A child support summaries and worksheets which are 
included by reference here and incorporated as if fully set forth. 
5 The Court encourages the parties to remain flexible with this arrangement It is certainly in TBE's best interests to 
have on-going contact with his siblings and to continue his relationship with bis grandmother Susan Geiger. 
Hopefully, the parties can reach an agreement because this is part of the balancing parents need to do to promote 
continuity and stability for their children. 
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Opinion and Order on Appeal dated May 12, 2016 
Clerk's Record, pages 359-365 
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STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OR-t."iEL 
SARAH M. GEIGER, ) 
) C 
Respondent/Petitioner, ) 
) 
v. .) 
) 
BRANDON T. ELLIOT, ) 
) 
Appellant/Respondent. ) 
This matter is before the Court on Defendant Brandon Elliot's appeal of the magistrate 
court's Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and Order and the subsequent Judgment 
Regarding Modification of Visitation Custody and Child Support.1 Sarah Geiger was 
represented by Manderson Miles. Brandon Elliot was represented by Charles Stroschein. The 
Court heard oral argument on the matter April 21, 2016. The Court, having read the briefs 
submitted by the parties, and having heard oral argument of counsel, and being fully advised in 
the matter, hereby renders its decision. 
PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
On December 6, 2011, Sarah Geiger filled a complaint for paternity, custody, visitation, 
and support of her child, TBE. After Geiger and Brandon Elliot entered into mediation, an 
agreement was reached noting that Elliot was the father of TBE and agreeing that the parties 
1 Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and Order, entered by the Hon. Kent J. Merica on August 17, 20 I 5. 
Judgment regarding custody entered on October 16, 2015. 
1 
Geiger v. Elliot 
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would have joint legal and physical custody. On April 23, 2012 an Order Re: Custody, 
Visitation, and Child Support (hereinafter "custody agreement") was entered adopting the 
agreement reached by the parties. Pursuant to that agreement, Geiger would be the primary 
--.. -·---···· -.- · fesidenti~t..-Etlie-t.-had.-a blGCk, of four.days off from.work each we_ek ancl.he wo1-ddJ;t.i~-:.:,,-... ~.~·, .... ,,_..._. 
TBE from 6 a.m. on his second day off to 5 p.m. on his third day off every week. 
On March 16, 2015, Elliot filed a Motion to Modify the custody agreement asserting that 
his new job conflicted with the current agreement in place, thus there was a substantial and 
material change in circumstance requiring modification of the custody agreement. With his 
motion, Elliot filed a parenting plan which sought to modify the existing custody agreement by 
granting each parent physical custody of IBE every other week. 
A hearing was held on the matter on June 26, 2015, after which the magistrate issued his 
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and Order on August 17, 2015. The magistrate found 
that Elliot moving in with his then girlfriend Ms. Wilcoxon did not amount to a substantial 
change as Elliot and Wilcoxon were a couple at the time the original custody order was entered. 
The magistrate also did not find that Elliot's change in work schedule was a material change of 
circumstances that would justify a change in custody; however, he did agree that such change 
justified a revision to the parent-sharing arrangement.2 The magistrate concluded that Elliot 
would have physical custody of TBE every other Wednesday through Sunday commencing and 
.ending at 5 p.m. On November 23, 2015, Elliot filed this appeal. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
"A trial court's findings of fact will not be set aside unless clearly erroneous, which is to 
say that findings that are based upon substantic11 and competent; although conflicv..ng, evidence 
will not be disturbed on appeal." DeChambeau v. Estate of Smith, 132 Idaho 568, 571, 976 P.2d 
2 Findings o[Fact, at 8-9. 
2 
Geiger v. Elliot 
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922, 925 (1999). The credibility and weight to be given evidence is in the province of the trial · · 
court, and this Court liberally construes the trial court's fmdings of fact in favor of the judgment 
~ntered. Bouten Constr. Co. v. HF. Magnuson Co., 133 Idaho 756, 760, 992 P.2d 751, 755. 
• .,.-,. ~.-, •. · .. ,, (-,l .Q9».) :cHe.wev:©r,.t,when the"issue.is..one..ofJaw, this, Court exercisesftee.revi_f;Wt,.Q.JJ.he,,tci,siit ....... .,.,, .. ;..,,- c-··""· ""'"'"······:,,.,. "·J 
court's decision. Wilkins v. Wilkins, 137 Idaho 315,318, 48 P.3d 644, 647 (2002). A trial court's 
child custody decision will not be overturned absent an abuse of discretion. Suter v. Biggers, 157 
Idaho 542, 546, 337 P.3d 1271, 1275 (2014). 
A trial court does not abuse its discretion as long as the court recognizes the issue 
as one of discretion, acts within the outer .limits of its discretion and consistently 
with the legal standards applicable to the available choices, and reaches its 
decision through an exercise of reason. When the trial court's decisions affect 
children, the best interests of the child is the primary consideration. 
Lamont v. Lamont, 158 Idaho 353, 356, 347 P.3d 645,648 (2015)(intemal citations omitted). 
ANALYSIS 
1. Magistrate's Order 
Elliot asserts that the magistrate abused his discretion when rendering his decision on 
Elliot's motion by ignoring facts, case law, and Idaho Code. 3 It is clear from the record that 
magistrate was aware that this issue was one within his discretion. 4 The decision reached by the 
magistrate was well within the broad outer limits of that discretion. Therefore, the only issue 
before this Court is whether the magistrate reached its decision through exercise of reason. 
The crux of Elliot's argument is that the magistrate failed to recognize several substantial 
and material changes of circumstance, and did not follow the case law and factors set out in LC. 
§32-717.5 J.C. §32-717 states inpertinentpa.11: 
3 Appellant's Amended Reply Brief, at 12. 
4 Findings of Fact, at 6. · 
5 Appellant's Amended Reply Brief, at 9. 
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fu an action for divorce the court may.- before and after judgment, give such 
direction for the custody, care and education of the children of the marriage as 
may seem necessary or proper in the best interests of the children. The court shall 
consider all relevant factors which may include: (a) The wishes of the child's 
parent or parents as to his or her custody; (b) The wishes of the child as to his or 
--,--·-· """"""·: .. ~- :'=-".~MJ#-J;I~!Q©@.~.{~).-1:h.¥. .. W.ts:!£.tifln@d .i.!!t~el~!iqM.hiJ2_9[Q!~ ~~j,~tq!!!,9!,,~~~- ··--·- _ . 
' parent or parents, and his or her siblings; (d) The child's adjustment to his or iier - ·-···-,·,- '"''' .. , .... , ·'·'""''""'"' ... 
home, school, and community; ( e) The character and circumstances of all 
individuals invoived; (f) The need to promote continuity and stability in the life of 
the child; and (g) Domestic violence as defined in section 39-6303, Idaho Code, 
whether or not in the presence of the child. 
Elliot asserts that if the magistrate had applied the factors set forth in I.C. §32-717 there 
would have been an entirely different decision.6 However, the factors listed in I.C. §32-717 are 
not intended to be exclusively considered above any others. The Idaho Supreme Court in 
interpreting that statute has held: 
The statute gives trial courts wide discretion in making custody determinations, 
but it requires them to consider all relevant factors when evaluating the best 
interest of the child. Relevant factors may include the parents' wishes for the 
child's custody; the child's wishes; the interrelationship and interaction of the 
child with his or her parents and siblings; the extent the child has adjusted to his 
or her school, home, and community; the circumstances and character of the 
persons involved; the need to promote continuity and stability in the child's life; 
and domestic violence. This list of factors is not exhaustive or mandatory and 
courts are free to consider other factors that may be relevant. 
Bartosz v. Jones, 146 Idaho 449,454, 197 P.3d 310, 315 (2008)(intemal citations omitted). 
The magistrate acknowledged that Elliot had changed jobs and that he now lived with 
Ms. Wilcoxon but did not find these changes to be substantial. The magistrate court ultimately 
found that there had not been a substantial change in circumstances that would justify changing 
custody from Geiger to Elliot. fu·reaching that conclusion, the magistrate laid out an extensive 
number of factual findings that he found supported that decision. 7 
6 Appellant's,4,mended Reply Brief, at 10. 
7 Findings of Fact, at 7-9. 
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Elliot now asks this Court to second guess the findings of the magistrate and detemrine- · 
that the factors weigh in his favor. 
When reviewing the magistrate court's findings of fact, this Court will not set 
aside the findings on appeal unless they are clearly erroneous such that they are 
::,:.,,. ,-=='·'•··--+=.~,.,,;.-.~=~~-- not based,upon ·substantial-and. competent.evidence. Even iftb~-ey,i..de~~A.s, .. ., .. , . ..,~ .. .,.,._,.,,.1<.:,zc ....... 1,..."-:..1-...,.,......,...,,._... ___ , 
conflicting, findings of fact based on substantial evidence will not be overturned 
on appeal. 
Lamont, at 356, 347 P.3d at 648. 
In arguing that the magistrate's findings were erroneous, Elliot offers little more than 
argument that his interpretation of the evidence is right and the magistrate's is wrong. Elliot does 
not meet his burden to prove that the magistrate's decision was not based on substantial and 
competent evidence. The record before this Court indicates the contrary; the magistrate weighed 
the relevant factors, and then - through clear exercise of reason- made a detennination based 
upon the best interest of the child. 8 
In light of the record before this Court, Elliot's argument that the magistrate ignored, or 
didn't properly consider certain factors, fails to meet his burden to show the magistrate abused 
his discretion. Therefore, the decision of the magistrate court is affirmed. 
2. Attorney's Fees 
Geiger asserts that Elliot's argument is frivolous and without foundation and requests that 
she be awarded costs and attorney's fees pursuant to Appellate Rule4I and I.C §12-121.9 "An 
award of attorney fees on appeal. pursuant to I. C. § 12-121 is permitted for a prevailing party 
when the Court determines that an appeal was brought, pursued, or defended in a manner that 
was frivolous, unreasonable, or without foundation." Lamontv. Lamont, 158 Idaho 353,362,347 
P.3d 645, 654 (2015). The decision to award attorney's fees under I.C. § 12-121 is at the 
8 The magistrate noted that TBE bad primarily resided with Geiger for the past 3 years; that Geiger has seen to his 
medical needs; arranged child care; and provided appropriate parenting for TBE. 
9 Amended Respondent's Brief, at 9. 
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' .. 
discretion of the Court: Jim & Maryann Plane'Family Trust v. Skinner, 157 Idaho 927, 342 PJd .. 
639, 647 (2015). 
In this custody-modification proceeding, the magistrate recognized and applied the 
I 
I 
I 
.~,-,...,.._,a:._,;,,-a-·..a.eorrect·-legaJ,standards'"-a.nd,propedy.,reached..a.cG.nG:lYSion-~best:-mter,est~of,T,B.E,,.J'bi~;.Q0$.~ •• .:.,_. ....... .;.. ... --.·--~-J 
like most custody decisions submitted to magistrates, presented itself as a multiple choice 
examination with more than one possible correct answer, but no obviously wrong one. In such a 
situation, it is impossible to find that the magistrate abused his discretion in upwardly adjusting 
the parenting time for Elliot but not changing custody of TBE. 
Elliot's argument was in essence only that the magistrate should be second guessed and a 
different answer reached in his favor. His conclusory assertions are not enough to _overcome the 
magistrate's thorough discussion and discretionary :findings. This Court, like the Idaho Supreme 
Court in Lamont, is unconvinced that there were genuine issues of law or fact raised, and 
therefore finds that this appeal was pursued in a manner that was frivolous, unreasonable, and 
without foundation. Accordingly, this Court awards Geiger's costs and fees incurred on appeal. 
ORDER 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the decision of the magistrate court is AFFIRMED. IT 
IS FURTHER ORDERED that Geiger's motion for costs and fees is GRANTED. 
Dated this /Z,....day of May 2016. 
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